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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
JUROR MISCONDUCT: AVAILABILITY OF A HEARING
ON ALLEGED ILLEGAL VIEW
Defendants were convicted of attempted burglary in the third degree
and possession of burglar's instruments.' Their counsel moved for a
new trial, on his own affidavit, deposing that certain jurors had told him
of an unauthorized visit during the trial to the scene of defendants'
alleged crime, apparently in order to better understand the evidence.
Denial of defendants' motion for a new trial was affirmed by the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court,2 and-on appeal to the New
York Court of Appeals-again affirmed. Held: Affidavit of defense
counsel that certain jurors had reported an unauthorized visit during
a trial to the scene of the alleged crime is not such competent proof of
jury misconduct as to require a new trial. People v. DeLucia, 15 N.Y.
2d 294, 206 N.E.2d 324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821
(1965.)'
A juror's unauthorized view of the scene of a crime is misconduct
and, if prejudicial to the defendant, constitutes ground for a new trial."
In cases in which defendant claims that jury misconduct prejudiced
his right to a fair trial, the prohibition against jurors impeaching their
verdict by allegations of their own misconduct' may deny defendant
his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial by excluding the only evidence
establishing such misconduct.' Traditionally, enforcement of this pro-
hibition has been justified on the need for certainty of jury verdicts,
protection of jurors from harassment, and freedom of juryroom delib-
eration.7
The majority opinion in the principal case, after stating the rule
excluding jurors' affidavits that attempt to impeach a verdict by alleg-
1 One defendant was convicted of a felony and the other of a misdemeanor. The
distinction results from a provision in the N.Y. PENAL CODE to the effect that a person
convicted of possession of burglar's instruments shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
unless he has a prior conviction, in which case he is guilty of a felony. N.Y. PENAL
CoDE § 408.
2 21 App. Div. 2d 805, 252 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1964).
'15 BUFFALO L. REV. 217 (1965).
4People v. Kraus, 147 Misc. 906, 265 N.Y. Supp. 294 (1933). Cf. Eastwood v. Peo-
ple, 3 Park 25 (N.Y. 1855), holding that, if an unauthorized viewing takes place in a
capital case, there will be a mistrial declared without investigation as to whether
prejudice was established.
58 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6 "Many cases might occur where they [affidavits of jurors] ought to be admitted,
and there was no other source from which the information they contained could be
derived." Den ex dem. Popino v. McAllister, 7 N.J.L. 46, 52 (Sup. Ct. 1823) (Rosell,
J., dissenting).
7 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); In re Nunns, 188 App. Div. 424, 176
N.Y. Supp. 858, 38 N.Y. Crim. 7 (1919).
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hig jury misconduct, reasoned that, since jurors' affidavits were ex-
cluded, the hearsay affidavit of defense counsel must also be excluded.
The majority re-emphasized their holding by stating that, "absent any
competent proof that the defendants were prejudiced in a substantial
right affecting the verdict, the motion [for a new trial] was properly
denied."8 Defendants' obvious guilt was clear from the court's observa-
tion that "the proof adduced was sufficient as a matter of law to support
the judgment of conviction."'
The exclusionary rule relating to jurors' affidavits was originated by
Lord Mansfield in 1785,1" in spite of the common prior practice of
allowing jurors to testify about their own misconduct. 1 The rule gained
wide acceptance in American courts, and the United States Supreme
Court recognized it in 1915, stating that "unquestionably the general
rule, [is] that the losing party cannot, in order to secure a new trial,
use the testimony of jurors to impeach the verdict."' The exclusionary
rule, while suffering from diverse interpretation," is usually justified
on the premise that the jury system might suffer irreparable harm if
jurors were allowed to testify about their own misconduct and thereby
impeach their verdict. 4 Strict application of the rule can, however,
result in injustice when evidence establishing jury prejudice against
the defendant is excluded. Exclusion of such evidence would certainly
occur in cases in which the misconduct took place during secret jury-
room deliberations. The likelihood of important evidence being dis-
regarded would also occur, though to a lesser degree, when the mis-
conduct occurred outside the juryroom, since the establishment of
such misconduct as grounds for a new trial may depend on whether
or not disinterested third parties can be found to testify to the jurors'
actions."
Judicial exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been established
in several jurisdictions in order to avoid the possible injustice arising
from a blanket exclusion of jurors' affidavits alleging their own mis-
8 15 N.Y.2d at 296, 206 N.E.Zd at 325, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
0 Ibid.
10 Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785).
11 Norman v. Beamont, Willes 484, 125 Eng. Rep. 1281 (1744) ; Phillips v. Fowler,
Barnes 441, 94 Eng. Rep. 994 (1735).
"2 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269.
"S 15 BUFFALo L. REv. 217, 218 & nn.5-11 (1965).
"4 See Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947) (majority
vote, used by jurors to reach decision, considered insufficient reason to overturn ver-
dict).
'5 A search for indifferent third parties to testify about the jurors' actions would
never occur unless the court acted on the basis of the jurors' affidavit-an anomalous
circumstance, at best, if the affidavits are adjudged inadmissable.
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conduct. The most common exception, and one of the earliest, is the
so-called "Iowa rule," which allows a juror to testify about any matter
that does not "inhere" in the verdict. 6 The testimony admitted under
this exception is generally limited to misconduct of a factual or
objective character.' The juror may testify about anything which is
physically discernible, but is precluded from testifying about mis-
conduct which primarily relates to his or another juror's mental
processes. This distinction attempts to prevent only testimony that
relates to strictly subjective activity, such as a misunderstanding of
the evidence, or personal prejudice.' Each juror exercises an individ-
ual method to determine his vote, which, though subject to possible
influence from personal beliefs and dispositions, 9 nonetheless should
not be subject to examination." On the other hand, overt juror
misconduct could deprive a defendant of a fair trial, and is a proper
object of close scrutiny.
Another judicial exception to the exclusionary rule, advanced by
the dissent in the principal case, would admit affidavits of jurors
alleging their own misconduct if the misconduct took place outside
the juryroom." The justification for such a distinction would appear
to be the desire to maintain the sanctity of the juryroom, along with
a belief that misconduct outside the juryroom is more susceptible of
confirmation without violating a juror's right to maintain silence
about the decisional process undertaken in reaching a verdict. On
the other hand, the dissenters do not elaborate their reasoning and
only argue that the exclusionary rule was historically applicable only
to juryroom deliberations.22
Legislative inroads have also been made on the rule against self-
impeachment. Most common is the statute which allows jurors to
testify about verdicts reached by chance.23 Both the Model Code of
Evidence' and the Uniform Rules of Evidence" would allow testimony
16 Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
'7 Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874).
18 Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
'9 Welshire v. Bruaw, 331 Pa. 392, 200 Atl. 67 (1938) ; State v. McChesney, 114
Wash. 113, 194 Pac. 551 (1921).
20 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 301 (1942) ; UNIFORm RTLES OF EVIDENCE rule
41 (1953).
23 15 N.Y.2d at 297, 206 N.E.2d at 325, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 379, citing State v. Kociolek,
20 NJ. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955).
22 bid.
23 CAL. Cirv. PROC. § 657; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 10-602 (1948) ; MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-5603 (1949) ; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 33-1905; UTAH CODE ANN. rule 59
(1953) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 4.76.020 (1958).
24 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 301 (1942).
25 UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 44.
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by a juror as to any fact of misconduct, so long as such testimony does
not encroach upon the proscribed area of the juror's personal motives
and mental processes.
While the court in the principal case did not choose to recognize
or apply any of the above exceptions to the exclusionary rule, its
holding is sufficiently confused to raise a question of the circum-
stances in which the rule is to be applied in the future. In essence,
the majority opinion stated that the affidavits would not be admitted
in evidence, and upheld the denial of defendants' motion for a new
trial because there was no "competent proof that defendants were
prejudice ..... .Taken literally, the court's position prevented
defendants' use of what was apparently the only means of proving
prejudice, i.e., the affidavits alleging misconduct, while basing its denial
of a new trial on a lack of "competent proof" of prejudice. Such a
contradiction leads to the inference that the New York court may,
in future cases, exclude only those affidavits which do not raise a
presumption of prejudice on their alleged facts. It is submitted that
any attempt to determine prejudice in the manner suggested would
not sufficiently take the place of a hearing in which the jurors, them-
selves, could testify, and other evidence of prejudice could be adduced.
One possible explanation for the failure of the court in the principal
case to relax the exclusionary rule may be found in the facts of the
case itself. The affidavits attempting to impeach the verdict were
hearsay, and would have had to be excluded on this ground under
any circumstances. Too, the gravamen of the charge of attempted
third degree burglary and possession of burglar's tools bears little
relation to the scene of the attempted crime. Under New York law
an attempted crime is, by definition, an uncompleted crime; 7 there-
fore, a view by the jury of the scene of the alleged crime could seldom
create prejudice. Also, a view of the place where defendants were
apprehended in possession of burglar's tools would seldom be prejudi-
cial. Finally, other evidence of defendants' guilt was apparently
overwhelming.2" These considerations do not, however, justify an
unqualified acceptance of the exclusionary rule. Such aggravating
considerations may not be present in a future case, and blanket appli-
cation of the rule would work an injustice. Because of the possibility
of future injustice, and because application of the rule, as Judge
2615 N.Y.2d at 296, 206 N.E.2d at 325, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
27 N.Y. PENAL CODE § 2 defines attempt as "an act, done with intent to commit a
crime, and tending but failing to effect its commission.'
2 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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Learned Hand has said, "offers an easy escape from embarrassing
chores,"29 it is submitted that the decision in the principal case did not
serve the ends of substantial justice.
It remains to be noted whether, when dealing with the exclusionary
rule and jury misconduct which bears on the evidence considered by
the jury, a distinction should be made between civil and criminal
cases. In civil cases the quantum of proof is less than in criminal
cases, and jury misconduct might reasonably be given less weight
in determining if the verdict ought to be impeached. On the other
hand, the requirement of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal case would indicate that any misconduct which could
reasonably affect a juror's vote should be thoroughly investigated.
In addition, a unanimous verdict is seldom required in civil cases, and
it would seem reasonable to disregard a civil juror's misconduct if
his vote was not essential to the verdict. On the other hand, jurors who
receive unauthorized evidence often communicate their misappro-
priated knowledge to other jurors, and the misconduct of one juror
may taint the verdict of all. It is apparent that, in order to effectuate
a distinction between civil and criminal cases in application of the
exclusionary rule, a court would be required to undertake a close
investigation of the jurors' activities both within and without the
juryroom. It is doubtful that a court in either a civil or criminal
case would be willing to undertake such an investigation, which might
involve violations of juryroom secrecy.
LIMITING LANGUAGE IN UNPURCHASED POLICY
PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY TO
PURCHASED COVERAGE
Plaintiff's truck was hit by a tree felled by a logging contractor's
employee. The truck was insured by defendant insurance company
against damage due to collision,1 but plaintiff had not purchased cover-
age under the comprehensive clause.2 Plaintiff brought an action
29 Jorgenson v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947).
1 "Coverage E-Collision or Upset: To pay for direct and accidental loss of or
damage to the automobile ... caused by collision of the automobile with another
object.... Jones v. Virginia Sur. Co., 401 P.2d 570, 571 (Mont. 1965).
2 "Coverage D-Comprehensive Loss or Damage to the automobile, Except by
Collision or Upset: To pay for direct and accidental loss of or damage to the auto-
mobile ... except loss caused by collision of the automobile with another object ....
Breakage of glass and loss caused by ... falling objects ... shall not be deemed loss
caused by collision or upset." Ibid.
